

18 THIS DRAFT USEFUL ENOUGH TO BE COMPLETED
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SUGGESTED DRAFT OUTLINE
 PRM -11, PART 2

~~EXPLANATION~~ (Goal is a paper covering each "bullet" in the outline in no more than one single-spaced page. Suggested thrust of each ~~portion~~ portion of the paper indicated in parantheses)

I. INTRODUCTION

--Historical retrospect.

(Trend toward strengthening of the "COmmunity" concept and adding to DCI responsibilities reflected in E.O. 11905, Presidential memo of 5 Nov 1971, and external studies of intelligence activities.)

--Relationship of management, structure and performance

(Effective functioning of the intelligence effort depends on a management and structural arrangement which fits the prevailing concept of what the U.S. intelligence program should be, e.g., tightly controlled centrally, loosely coordinated, etc.)

--What the country seems to want out of intelligence management

(Assurance the needed information is available to the Government, while at the same time the operation is efficient in terms of dollar use and is not doing illegal or improper things.)

--The need to balance DCI responsibilities and authorities.

(Existing directives and the functioning of the Community have moved the DCI into a central role, but he has been given responsibilities without commensurate authorities. These need to be brought in balance either by strengthening authorities or reducing responsibilities.)

II DCI RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

-As intelligence advisor to the President.

(Adequacy of authority depends on what President ~~expects~~ expects from the ~~authorities~~ authorities; if the President expects to hold the DCI accountable as manager of the Community, the DCI authorities are inadequate.)

- As intelligence advisor to the Congress

(Clarification needed as to DCI's freedom of action and limitations.)

- As producer of national intelligence

(Responsibilities are clear, but several management issues are involved, as indicated in Section III.)

- As protector of sources and methods

(Lack of criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures means DCI has no actual authority in this area.)

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- As operating head of the Central Intelligence Agency
(Relatively minor amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949 would be helpful, but authorities are generally adequate.)
- As the "manager" of the Intelligence Community
(Responsibilities and authorities are not commensurate here, as is explained in more detail in Section III following.)

III. DCI INVOLVEMENT IN MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The following problem areas are in terms of the three specific areas ~~mentioned~~ PRM-11 requested be reviewed: The DCI as intelligence adviser to the President, as the official responsible for production of national intelligence and as the manager of the national foreign intelligence program and budget. Since the DCI must advise the President on all aspects of the intelligence program, all problem areas not directly and specifically related to production or resource allocation are ~~listed~~ listed as related to the DCI's Presidential advisory role.

As advisor to the President

- Assuring the availability of national intelligence as needed
(Direct tasking authority of the DCI applies only to CIA; ~~and~~ use of resources of other organizations depends upon cooperation and coordination. This problem is particularly important in crisis situations.)
- Assuring proper interface and maximum combined utilization of national and tactical ~~resources~~ intelligence resources
(~~and~~ Defense Department concern that this could lead to some measure of DCI control of tactical intelligence resources has ~~prevented~~ deterred approaches to this problem.)
- Prevention of illegal or improper intelligence activities.
(DCI authorities in this area apply only to CIA ~~activities~~ activities.)
- Protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods
(DCI can admonish but has no investigative authority outside of CIA, and no criminal sanctions apply unless aid to foreign government can be shown. Legislation such as H.R. 12008 would be helpful.)
- Coordination of counterintelligence activities
(Lack of national-level policy guidance is hurtful to the effort; DCI needs additional coordinating authority.)

- Control of compartmentation/decompartmentation

(Machinery for ~~existing~~ making changes exists, but individual organizations can delay procedures by exercising their prerogatives.)

- Transition to wartime functioning

(Under present arrangements, in the event of major war involving an attack on the United States, existing arrangements would not support the DCI in his role as advisor to the President.)

- Evaluation of Community performance

(The IC Staff is the DCI mechanism for this.)

- As the producer of national intelligence

- Identifying consumer needs and priorities

(Arrangements exist on paper, but need more rigorous execution, e.g., NSC semi-annual review.)

-Validation of requirements

(Arrangements adequate in SIGINT and imagery area, not in HUMINT)

-Allocation of collection tasks

(DCI lacks directive authority; individual managers control.)

-Improving the intelligence product

(Adequacy of resources is the question here.)

-~~DEVELOPMENT~~ Development of net assessments

(Problem exists only where US forces are involved; in this case intelligence ~~is~~ should be prepared to play the "Red" side. Where US forces and capabilities not involved, intelligence should further ~~its~~ develop its capabilities for complete net assessments.)

--Interface between national and departmental production

(DCI has no control over departmental production, ~~is~~ even where it is completely duplicative of national production.)

As manager of the National Foreign Intelligence Program b

-Organizational limitations on the DCI role

(In PRC review, DCI is one of four voices even though he is chairman. Departmental prerogatives run directly counter to a strong DCI role.)

~~The ~~existing~~ budget review/program development process~~

-The budget review/program development process

(Lack of clear DCI authority for direct access to intelligence program managers, regardless of their organizational location, restricts his courses of action.)

-Planning for the future

(Further development of the IC Staff program is needed.)

-Inter-program resource transfers

(The ability of the DCI to do this will be a measure of the reality of his role as manager of ~~the~~ Intelligence Community resources.)

An overall ~~assessment~~ assessment

(A summary of the key problem areas identified in the foregoing part of this section as they relate to authorities and responsibilities of the DCI.)

IV CONCEPTUAL OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Determination of the proper role of the DCI and how the Intelligence Community should function and be controlled is dependent on the basic concept with which the U.S. intelligence effort is addressed. The following are the primary alternatives.

(Pros and cons will be listed for each of the following)

- The Intelligence Community should be a tightly controlled hierarchical structure, or a very loosely connected group of organizations that acts jointly on ~~the~~ the basis of voluntary coordination.
- The DCI should function as line manager of the Intelligence Community, or he should be a first-among-equals who serves as leader without directive authority
- An integral combined budget for the combined elements of the Community will be prepared centrally, or each department and agency having intelligence capabilities will be solely responsible for development of its budget.
- Production of national intelligence will be a coordinated effort involving all major production offices, or it will be essentially a CIA responsibility.

V. ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The basic concept that the President and his National Security Council have as to how the Intelligence Community should function will determine whether and to what extent organizational changes are changes. The structure and functioning of the Intelligence Community should reflect which the the concepts outlined in Section IV are held by the President and the NSC. The following, with their pros and cons